We consider a class of sequential interdiction settings where the interdictor has incomplete initial information about the network while the evader has complete knowledge of the network, including its structure and arc costs. In each time period, the interdictor can block at most k arcs known to him for the duration of the period. By observing the evader's actions, the interdictor learns about the network structure and costs and thus, can adjust his actions in subsequent time periods. It is known from the literature that if the evader is greedy (i.e., she uses the shortest available path in every time period), then under some assumptions on the the feedback generated from the evader's actions, the greedy interdiction policies that block k-most vital arcs in each time period are efficient and have a finite regret. In this paper, we consider the evader's perspective and explore strategic evasion policies under the assumption that the interdictor is greedy. In particular, we show that the evader's problem is NP -hard even for two time periods. Then we derive constructive properties of optimal evasion policies for two time periods when the interdictor has no initial information about the network structure.
Introduction
Network interdiction is typically posed as a one-or multi-stage decision-making problem in a network with two decision-makers, an interdictor and an evader. The evader traverses in the network (e.g., between two fixed nodes, a source and a destination), while the interdictor aims to disrupt to the maximum possible extent (or completely stop) the evader's movement. Network interdiction forms a rather broad class of deterministic and stochastic optimization problems with applications mostly arising in the military, law-enforcement and infectious disease control contexts, see surveys in [1, 2] and the references therein.
Perhaps, the most well-known and studied network interdiction problem is the shortest path interdiction problem [3] , where the interdictor seeks for a set of arcs whose removal subject to some budgetary constraint, maximizes the cost of the shortest path between two specified nodes. That is, the evader is assumed to move along the shortest path between these nodes. If the interdictor is allowed to block at most k arcs, then this problem is often referred to as the k-most vital arcs problem [4] . The shortest path interdiction problem is known to be NP -hard [4] . Nevertheless, rather effective exact solution approaches for various versions of the network interdiction problem exist in the literature, see, e.g., [3, 5] .
A number of studies consider the network interdiction problem in stochastic settings [6, 7, 8, 9] , where either the outcomes of interdiction actions are uncertain, or there is uncertainty with respect to the evader's actions. An interesting dynamic deterministic version of the problem has been recently considered in [10] , where the evader can dynamically adjust her 2 movement at every node of her path in the network by observing the interdictor's actions. The interdictor, in turn, can interdict arcs any time the evader arrives at a node in the network. It is also assumed that the interdictor has a limited interdiction budget.
The current study is motivated by a recent work of Borrero et al. in [11] . Specifically, in their model the interdictor and the evader interact sequentially over multiple time periods. In each time period, the interdictor can block at most k arcs only for the duration of the current period, while the evader is assumed to be greedy, i.e., in each time period the evader traverses along the shortest path between two fixed nodes in the interdicted network.
The key feature of the model in [11] is that the interdictor has incomplete initial information about the network, including its structure and costs, but learns about the network structure and arc costs by observing the evader's actions. In particular, it is assumed that the feedback is deterministic and perfect that is, the interdictor learns about the existence and the exact costs of the arcs used by the evader in the previous time periods. The quality of an interdiction policy is measured using either cumulative regret or time stability. The former is defined as the differ-ence in the total cost incurred by the evader under the current interdiction policy against the policy of an oracle interdictor with prior complete knowledge of the network. Clearly, the oracle interdictor implements an optimal solution of the k-most vital arcs problem in each time period.
Time stability is defined as the number of time periods that are necessary for the policy to gain sufficient amount of information in order to implement a solution of the k-most vital arcs problem that is also optimal in the full information network for the remainder of the time horizon.
The main results of [11] can be summarized as follows. First, it is shown that for their deterministic setting, in general, there do not exist policies that perform better than any other policy for any graph consistent with the initial information available to the interdictor. Thus, the focus of [11] is on the greedy and robust interdiction policies. They are greedy because they block a set of the k-most vital arcs from the network known to the interdictor in every time period; they are robust because whenever the exact cost of the arc is not known to the interdictor, then the policies assume the worst-case scenario for the evader. These policies turn out to be "efficient" in the following sense: (i ) they eventually find and maintain an optimal solution to the k-most vital arcs problem in the full information network (i.e., an optimal solution of the oracle interdictor), within a finite number of time periods (possibly, instance dependent); and (ii ) this class of policies is not dominated that is, for any possible instance of the initial information available to the interdictor and any policy that is not greedy and robust, there exists a greedy and robust policy that is strictly better (with respect to either the cumulative regret or time stability) than the aforementioned non-greedy and/or non-robust policy for some graph that is consistent with the initial information available to the interdictor. Property (i ) of greedy and robust policies also implies that they have a finite regret. Furthermore, these policies detect when the instantaneous regret reaches zero in real time, i.e., when an optimal solution of the oracle interdictor is found. Finally, in addition to these attractive theoretical properties, the results of computational experiments in [11] also confirm the superiority of greedy and robust interdiction policies against several other benchmark policies.
Note that in [11] , similar to the vast majority of the related interdiction literature, the authors focus on the interdictor's perspective. However, given that the outlined greedy and robust interdiction policies are very simple to implement (which is important for their applicability in practical applications) and have attractive theoretical properties, it is natural to explore the evader's perspective. In particular, if we assume that the interdictor is greedy and robust, what are good strategic policies for the evader against greedy and robust interdiction policies and how can they be constructed ? These research questions form the main focus of the current study.
In particular, we consider the deterministic setting similar to [11] with an additional modification. Specifically, with respect to the initial information available to the interdictor, in [11] it is assumed that for some arcs the interdictor is aware only about some upper and lower bounds on their costs. In contrast, we assume that whenever the existence of the arc is known to the interdictor initially, then its cost is also known, which in fact, is a less favorable scenario for the evader, whose perspective we consider. Furthermore, recall that in the considered setting the feedback is perfect that is, whenever the arcs is used by the evader, its existence and precise cost information is revealed to the interdictor. Therefore, under our rather mild assumption on the initial information available to the interdictor, the greedy and robust interdiction policies of [11] reduce to simply the greedy ones.
Our formulation of the evader's problem can be viewed as a particular case of online combinatorial optimization problem with sleeping experts [12] , which is a generalization of the classical multi-armed bandit formulation (see, e.g., [13] ). The problem with stochastic loss functions and adversarial availability of actions is discussed in [14, 15] . The evader's problem coincides with the online adversarial shortest path problem [14] . Nevertheless, uniform mixing assumption [14] does not hold for deterministic strategies and the notion of regret (for example, per action regret [12, 16] ) compares an arbitrary policy with a policy of using the best ranked action in the hindsight, i.e., with the greedy evasion policy. A distinctive feature of our setting is that the evader's actions determine the information collected by the interdictor and, thus, influence the structure of the setting.
In view of the discussion above, the contribution of this paper (and its remaining structure) can be summarized as follows:
• In Section 2 we formulate the evasion model under the assumption that the interdictor follows a greedy interdiction policy. In the deterministic setting with perfect feedback, this model can be viewed as a sequential bilevel combinatorial optimization problem.
• In Section 3, we show that the evader's problem is NP -hard even for the setting with two time periods as long as there are no restrictions for the initial information available to the interdictor. Note that if there is only one time period, then under our assumptions further discussed in Section 2 the evader's problem coincides with the shortest path problem.
• In Section 4, we provide theoretical analysis of evasion policies in the setting with two time periods, where the interdictor has no initial information about the network arcs. We show that under some mild assumption, it is optimal for the evader to either follow a greedy policy or seek for two arc-disjoint paths with minimal total cost. The latter problem is known to be polynomially solvable, which implies that if the interdictor has no initial information about the network arcs, then the evader's problem is polynomially solvable for T = 2.
• In Section 5, we exploit these theoretical properties to develop a heuristic algorithm for the strategic evader in a more general setting with an arbitrary time horizon and no restrictions on the initial information available to the interdictor. In Section 6, we perform computational experiments that demonstrate that the proposed heuristic consistently outperforms the greedy evasion policy on several classes of synthetic network instances.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines promising directions for future research.
Notation. In the remainder of the paper we use the following notation. Let G = (N, A) be a connected weighted directed graph, where N and A denote its sets of nodes and directed arcs, respectively. Denote by c a a nonnegative arc cost associated with each arc a ∈ A. For A ′ ⊆ A we define a subgraph of G induced by this subset of arcs as G[A ′ ] = (N, A ′ ).
We assume that there are T time periods (epochs), where T ∈ Z >0 . In every time period, the evader traverses between two specified nodes in G, which are referred to as the source and destination nodes and denoted by s and f , respectively. Let P sf (G) be a set of all simple directed paths from s to f in G. Hence, path P ∈ P sf (G) is given by a sequence of arcs
Then ℓ(P ) is the cost of path P ∈ P sf (G), that is ℓ(P ) = a∈P c a . Define z(G) as the cost of the shortest path from s to f in G, i.e., z(G) = min P ∈P sf (G) a∈P c a .
Mathematical Model
We consider a sequential decision-making process, where at each time t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T } an evader and an interdictor interact. The evader has full information about the underlying network, while the interdictor has limited information about its structure and costs. In particular, we assume that the interdictor initially observes a subnetwork G[A 0 ] of the given network G = (N, A), i.e., he is informed only about the existence of arcs in A 0 along with their costs {c a } a∈A 0 . Let
where we refer to C 0 as the initial information available to the interdictor, as it contains his initial knowledge about the structure and costs of the network. We assume that the set of nodes N is known to the interdictor upfront including the evader's source and destination nodes s and f , respectively. Then in each time period t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T } the following sequence of events takes place:
1. The interdictor chooses set I t ⊆ A t−1 of at most k arcs to be blocked for exactly one period.
2. The evader traverses along path P t ∈ P sf (G[A \ I t ). We refer to ℓ(P t ) as the evader's instantaneous loss. The evader also reveals the arcs in P t and their costs to the interdictor.
3. The interdictor updates the information available to him, i.e., A t = A t−1 ∪ P t .
We make several assumptions with respect to the construction of the evader's problem:
A1. In every time period the interdictor acts first. Furthermore, the interdictor is greedy in the sense that he always blocks a set of k-most vital arcs in the observed network, i.e.,
(1)
A2. The network G is not trivially k-separable, i.e., any subset of k arcs in G is not an s-f cut.
A3. If there is more than one possible choice for I t , then the interdictor blocks arcs following a well-defined deterministic rule, which is consistent in the sense that if I t is chosen from a collection of blocking solutions I, then it is also chosen from any collection of solutions I ⊆ I
A4. The evader has full information about the graph's structure and costs. The evader observes the interdictor's actions before choosing a path and cannot use interdicted arcs.
A5. The interdictor is initially given information only about subnetwork G[A 0 ]. Each time period he observes path P t and cost c a of each arc a ∈ P t used by the evader, i.e.,
Assumption A1 is motivated the fact that the interdictor has only limited information about the network. As we discuss in details Section 1, the study in [11] establishes a number of attractive and practically relevant features of greedy interdiction policies. Assumption A2 is technical as it ensures that the evader's problem is feasible at every time period.
Assumption A3 implies that the interdictor's policies are deterministic. The consistency assumption mimics an analogous assumption in [11] for the evader's policies. For example, one can think that in each time period the interdictor ranks all feasible blocking solutions in the observed network based on some criteria, e.g., their costs to the evader, resolving ties according to any deterministic criteria. Then the interdictor selects the highest-rank blocking solution from such a list.
Assumption A4 implies that the evader has some degree of monitoring of the interdictor's actions. As pointed out in [11] , this assumption can also be interpreted in the context of repeated interactions in a stochastic setting, where such monitoring might arise naturally from the evasion decisions by trial and error in multiple time periods. Assumption A5 represents the case of the perfect (or transparent) feedback (from the evader to the interdictor), which is common in the learning theory literature, see, e.g., [17] . This assumption is also made in [11] .
Finally, recall that the interdictor has full information about the costs of arcs in A 0 . Thus, A5 implies that whenever existence of the arc is known to the interdictor at any time period, then he is also aware of its cost.
In view of the discussion above, the evader's problem can be formulated as the following 2T -level combinatorial optimization problem:
where condition (2b) ensures that P t does not include arcs, which are blocked by the interdictor at time period t. Constraint (2c) requires I t to be a set of k-most vital arcs in G[A t−1 ] by assumption A1. Then (2d) states that a set of arcs known to the interdictor at time period t is updated according to assumption A5. Next, we provide formal definitions of evasion and interdiction policies along with some illustrative examples.
Definition 1.
An evasion policy is a deterministic sequence of set functions (π t )| t∈{1,...,T } such that for each t ≥ 1,
, where F π t summarizes the initial information as well as the history of the interdiction and evasion decisions up to time t: F π t = (C 0 , I 1 , P π 1 , . . . , I t−1 , P π t−1 , I t ).
Definition 2. The evader is referred to as greedy if she chooses the shortest path in the interdicted network in each time period. The corresponding evader's solution is referred to as greedy. Otherwise, the evader is considered to be strategic.
We denote by P SP t and P SE t , t ≥ 1, the evasion decisions by the greedy and strategic evaders, respectively. Given G and C 0 , define the cumulative loss of the evader under evasion policy π over T time periods as follows:
Let Π(G, C 0 ) be a class of all feasible evasion policies for G and C 0 . Given G, C 0 , k and T , we say that evasion policy π ∈ Π(G, C 0 ) strongly dominates policy
Definition 3. The interdictor is referred to as a greedy semi-oracle, if he has complete knowledge of the evader's policy π and whenever the k-most vital arcs problem in G[A t−1 ], i.e., problem (2c), has multiple optimal solutions, then the interdictor selects the one that is least favourable for the evader at time t. More precisely, he chooses a set of the k-most vital arcs For the costs of arcs (1, 4) and (1, 5) we assume that M > 5.
] so as to maximize the evader's loss, ℓ(P π t ), in period t under policy π. Furthermore, among these solutions the one that maximizes the cardinality of I t is preferred.
Simply speaking we assume that a greedy semi-oracle has full information about the network's structure and costs, but restricted to act in a greedy fashion blocking a set of the k-most vital arcs in the currently observed network. However, given his knowledge of G he can anticipate the evader's actions and thus, select solutions that are preferable for him. Furthermore, in Definition 3 we assume that the blocking decision of a greedy semi-oracle is always myopic since it takes into account only the evader's decision in the current time period.
The concept of a semi-oracle is introduced in [11] . We provide an additional requirement that the interdictor maximizes |I t | as his auxiliary objective. Note that for the evader's problem in period t, i.e., problem (2) with T = 1 and A 0 := A t−1 , the concept of the greedy semi-oracle corresponds to the pessimistic version of the bilevel problem that is, whenever the lower-level decision-maker (the interdictor) has multiple optimal solutions, then he prefers the one that is least favorable to the upper-level decision-maker (the evader); see [18] for further details on bilevel optimization.
Next, we provide two illustrative examples comparing the greedy evader against a strategic one. These examples provide us with further motivation of exploring the structural properties of strategic evasion policies discussed in Section 4.
In the examples, we assume that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle.
Example 1 (see Figure 1 ). Graph G used in this example, is provided in Figure 1 . Let s = 1 and f = 4 be the evader's source and destination nodes, respectively and M be a real number such that M > 5 . We also set T = 2, k = 2 and A 0 = ∅. First, we assume that the evader is greedy. As A 0 = ∅, then we have I 1 = ∅ and the greedy evader follows the shortest path from s to f given by P SP
Recall that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle and thus, he blocks arcs (1, 2) and (3, 4) Example 1 illustrates that if we evader is aware that the interdictor is greedy, then she can exploit this fact to decrease her cumulative loss. Furthermore, observe that the paths used by the strategic evader have some arcs in common with the shortest path. In Section 4 we formally establish that this observation is, in fact, a necessary condition for the strategic evasion policy whenever it outperforms the greedy one under the assumption that T = 2, k ≥ 1 and A 0 = ∅. Also note that, if M is sufficiently large, then for any given constant H ∈ R + we can guarantee that L SP 2 > HL SE 2 . Thus, the greedy evasion solution does not approximate the optimal solution with any constant factor.
Nonetheless, one may check by a straightforward calculation that in Example 1 the greedy policy turns to be optimal for any T ≥ 3. In Example 2 provided below we demonstrate that the greedy evasion policy can be dominated by a strategic policy for arbitrarily large T ≥ 2, while A 0 does not necessarily need to be empty.
Example 2 (see Figure 1 ). As in the previous example consider the graph depicted in Figure 1 .
In contrast to Example 1, we only change A 0 in a particular way and assume that T is arbitrarily large, i.e., T ≥ 2. More precisely, let A 0 be non-empty and given by A 0 = {(1, 3), (2, 4), (1, 4) , (1, 5) , (5, 4) }. First, we have I 1 = {(1, 4), (1, 5)} regardless of the evasion policy as the interdictor acts first. Then the greedy evader traverses along path P SP
Thus, the cumulative loss of the greedy evader is given by L SP T = 3 + M(T − 1) for any T ≥ 2. For a strategic evader, assume that she traverses through P SE
Then
It implies that the cumulative loss of the strategic evader is
. Therefore, for any T ≥ 2 we have:
and thus, the greedy evasion policy is suboptimal for arbitrarily large values of parameter T .
Computational Complexity
In this section we show that the evader's problem is NP -hard in the case of T = 2 even for instances where the interdiction problem is polynomially solvable. Furthermore, we prove that it is in NP -hard to distinguish instances where the evader's regret is 0 from those where it is strictly positive. The latter proposition rules out any type of approximation algorithm for the evader's problem. Henceforth, we assume that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle.
Observe that the evader's problem in the case of T = 1 can be solved efficiently whenever the k-most vital arcs problem in G[A 0 ] admits a polynomial time algorithm. However, in general the k-most vital arcs problem is known to be NP -hard [3] and, thus, checking feasibility of an evasion solution is already NP -hard. Therefore, an interesting question is to determine complexity of the evader's problem in the cases when the interdiction problem is "easy" to solve. We make the following remark. Remark 1. Alternatively, the evader may have access to an interdiction oracle which provides the optimal blocking decision in the network currently observed by the interdictor. The latter implies that the evader's problem with T = 1 coincides with the shortest path problem in the interdicted network, which is known to be polynomially solvable [19] . However, the existence of such an oracle is somewhat impractical, unless the evader makes her decisions sequentially given the oracle's response as a feedback.
In our complexity reduction below we assume that arc set A consists of two disjoint subsets, namely, the arcs that are either removable or unremovable by the interdictor, respectively. The notion of unremovable arcs is technical and made without loss of generality as we can make all arcs removable by a polynomial time modification of the original graph. Specifically, we can simply replace each unremovable arc (i, j) by k+1 parallel arcs of equal costs. This construction guarantees that after the removal of at most k arcs, at least one of these arcs remains intact and thus, nodes i and j remain connected by a directed arc. Alternatively (e.g., if parallel arcs are not allowed), we can replace each unremovable arc by k + 1 paths of length two by adding k + 1 and 2(k + 1) of new nodes and arcs, respectively, which results in the same outcome.
Next, we define the classical 3-SAT problem, which is known to be NP -complete [20] :
Question: is there a truth assignment τ for U that satisfies all the clauses in F ? or literal
We also define the decision version of the evader's problem (EP) for T = 2:
Problem 2-EP. Instance: network G together with source and destination nodes, subset of arcs A 0 known to the interdictor, the interdiction budget k ∈ Z >0 and threshold h ∈ R >0 .
Question: is there two paths P 1 , P 2 ∈ P sf (G) of total cost at most h that can be traversed sequentially by the evader given that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle?
The proof of our main result below is based on the reduction from the 3-SAT problem,
where for any instance of 3-SAT we construct a particular instance of the 2-EP problem. Following the discussion above we construct the instance of 2-EP such that feasibility of any evasion solution can be checked in polynomial time with respect to the number of arcs, i.e., the k-most vital arcs problem in both G[A 0 ] and G[A 1 ] is polynomially solvable. Our construction is inspired and similar to the one used in [21] , where it is shown that the problem of finding two minimum-cost arc-disjoint paths with non-uniform costs (e.g., changing over time or type of flow) is strongly NP -complete. However, our problem setting requires a somewhat different arc cost structure and the use of unremovable arcs defined at the beginning of this section.
Specifically, given boolean formula F = F 1 ∧F 2 ∧. . .∧F m , let p i be the number of occurrences of variable x i in F . For each variable x i we construct a lobe as illustrated in Figure 2 .
The lobes are connected to one another in series with w 1 = s and w n+1 = f . Recall that s and f are source and destination nodes, respectively. For each clause F j , we add two nodes y j , z j , j ∈ {1, . . . , m} together with arcs (s, y 1 ), (z j , y j+1 ), j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1} and (z m , f ) of cost 0. Finally, to connect clauses to variables we add the following arcs with zero
Here n = 3 is the number of lobes (or variables), m = 3 is the number of clauses, unremovable arcs and the arc costs within the lobes are not depicted (we refer to Figure 2 for the detailed depiction of the lobes). Nodes w 1 = s and w 4 = f are the source and destination nodes of the constructed graph, respectively. Suppose τ (x i ) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 3}. Green and blue arcs form paths P 1 and P 2 , respectively, i.e., the solution of the evader's problem with T = 2,
We refer to Figure 3 that illustrates the constructed graph for Proof. ⇒ Consider a "yes"-instance of 3-SAT. Thus, there exists assignment τ such that boolean formula F = F 1 ∧F 2 ∧. . .∧F m is satisfied under τ . Assume that we construct a graph for this instance as outlined in the discussion above. Next, let
Observe that I 1 = A 0 \ B 0 , since the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle. Actually, k is sufficiently large to block all arcs in I 1 and interdiction of I 1 maximizes the cost of the shortest
At t = 1 let the evader choose path P 1 that is constructed in the following way. It traverses through the lower part of the i-th lobe, if τ (x i ) = true, and it traverses through the upper part, if τ (x i ) = f alse. Observe that ℓ(P 1 ) = 3m + n. The information collected by the interdictor is updated and thus, A 1 = A 0 ∪ P 1 . Note that set of arcs A 1 consists of path P 1 together with parallel unremovable arcs and set A 0 \ B 0 that contains m + 1 distinct arcs that do not form a path from s to f . Furthermore, any evasion decision at t = 1 does not include arcs in A 0 and goes through all the lobes. We conclude that the interdiction problem in both G[A 0 ] and G[A 1 ] is polynomially solvable.
The presence of unremovable arcs of sufficiently large costs that are parallel to arcs in P 1 enforces the interdictor to remove arcs in the order of their costs. That is he blocks arcs of zero cost first and then blocks arcs of unit cost. Recall that k ≥ 3m. Therefore, the blocking decision at t = 2 consists of at least 3m arcs of P 1 including all arcs with zero cost. We conclude that I 2 ⊆ P 1 and I 2 ∩ I 1 = ∅ due to the fact k ≤ |P 1 | = 6m + n.
Then there exist at least m un-blocked subpaths
Together with arcs (s, y 1 ) and (z m , f ) they form path P 2 that is arc-disjoint with P 1 by their construction and can be traversed by the evader at t = 2. The cumulative loss of the evader equals h = 3m + n. Hence, the answer to the evader's problem is "yes." ⇐ Consider a "yes"-instance of the evader's problem with
Then there exist two paths that can be traversed sequentially by the evader and their total cost is at most h.
Observe that the choice of I 1 does not depend on the evader's actions. Path P 1 goes through either the upper or the lower part of each lobe. Therefore, path P 1 in the evader's decision has cost h = 3m + n, while P 2 has zero cost. Furthermore, the fact that k ≥ 3m implies that P 2 is arc-disjoint with P 1 .
Next, we note that as the cost of P 2 is zero, then it needs to contain arcs (s, y 1 ) and (z m , f ). Furthermore, P 2 needs to traverse through arcs (z j , y j+1 ), j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}} and each lobe through the zero cost arcs. We construct assignment τ in the following way: if P 1 traverses through the lower part of the i-th lobe, let τ (x i ) = true and, if it traverses through the upper part, then let τ (x i ) = f alse. According to this assignment due to the existence of P 2 each clause F j , j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}}, is satisfied, which implies the necessary result. Proof. Consider a modification of the network structure used in the above-mentioned reduction from the 3-SAT problem. Specifically, we modify the graph corresponding to a 3-SAT instance in the following way: each arc with a unit cost is replaced by an arc with a zero cost. Furthermore, we add an unremovable path P
Assume that all arcs in P ′ have cost M ′ = (7 + ⌊ n m ⌋)M. We refer to Figures 4 and 5 that illustrate the constructed graph for F = (
. First, we show that Theorem 1 holds true for the modified graph, if we change A 0 in a particular way.
⇒ Consider a "yes"-instance of 3-SAT. Thus, there exists assignment τ such that boolean
Assume that we construct a graph for this instance as outlined in the discussion above. Let B 0 be the set of all unremovable arcs and define set of arcs S 0 as follows. Assume that S 0 consists of arcs (w i , u i 1 ),
) in the lower part of the i-th lobe, otherwise. Consider the evader's problem with T = 2,
Note that the blocking decision in the first round is given by I 1 = A 0 \B 0 since the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle. We define path P 1 as in the proof of Theorem 1 and observe that ℓ(P 1 ) = 0; see Figure 4 , for example. Furthermore, the interdiction problem in G[A 0 ] and G[A 1 ] can be solved in polynomial time with respect to any feasible evasion decision at t = 1.
Then we show that with M ′ = (7 + ⌊ n m ⌋)M blocking decision I 2 in the second round satisfies P 1 ⊆ I 2 and I 1 ∩ I 2 = S 0 . Actually, if the interdictor blocks S 0 and all arcs in P 1 , then the cost of the shortest path in the currently observed network equals min{mM ′ ; 3mM + (3m + n)M}. If we choose M ′ so that inequality mM ′ > (6m + n)M holds, then I 2 = S 0 ∪ P 1 satisfies |I 2 | = (3m + n) + (6m + n) = k and forms a set of k-most vital arcs in the network currently observed by the interdictor. Specifically, if any arc between {(s,
is blocked, then the cost of the shortest path is strictly less than 3mM + (3m + n)M. We form path P 2 following the proof of Theorem 1. Then ℓ(P 2 ) = 0 and ℓ(P 2 ) + ℓ(P 1 ) = h = 0. We conclude that the evader's problem has answer "yes". 
in the lower part of the i-th lobe. We conclude that there exist two paths, i.e., P 1 and P 2 , that can be traversed sequentially by the evader with total cost at most h. Note that the interdiction decision in the first round does not depend on the evader's actions and is given by I 1 = A 0 \ B 0 . Furthermore, observe that path P 1 goes through each lobe by construction of set I 1 .
Following our discussion above, we conclude that I 2 = S 0 ∪ P 1 and thus, P 2 is arc-disjoint with P 1 . Observe that as the cost of P 2 is zero, then it needs to contain arcs (s, y 1 ) and (z m , f ). Furthermore, P 2 needs to traverse through arcs (z j , y j+1 ), j ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}} and each lobe through the zero cost arcs. Then a truth assignment τ can be constructed precisely as in the proof of Theorem 1.
The key observation is that the optimal objective value of the evader's problem is zero, while any nonoptimal solution has value of at least M. So, for any given constant H ∈ R + the existence of a polynomial time H-approximation algorithm for the evader's problem implies that the corresponding 3-SAT problem can be solved in polynomial time, that contradicts with P = NP . It concludes the proof. Figure 4 : The graph corresponding to a 3-SAT instance with F = ( We conclude that the evader's problem is notoriously hard even in the case of T = 2 assuming that the interdiction problem is polynomially solvable. Moreover, we cannot construct a polynomial time heuristic with a fixed worst case bound. The latter motivates us either to explore analytical properties of the optimal evasion policies in a simple case, i.e., T = 2 and A 0 = ∅, or propose a heuristic algorithm that takes into account alternative solutions and outperforms a naive greedy approach; see Examples 1 and 2 in Section 2.
Analysis of Greedy Policies
In this section we analyse the case when there are two time epochs and the interdictor has no initial information about the network, i.e., T = 2 and A 0 = ∅. Under some mild assumption we show that the optimal solution of the evader's problem in this case is either greedy, or consists of two distinct paths that intersect with the overall shortest path. Furthermore, in the specific case of k = 1 we prove that the greedy evasion policy is optimal.
In the remainder of this section for simplicity of exposition we assume that the costs of all possible paths from s to f are distinct. Thus, we can enumerate them in the strictly increasing order of their costs, i.e.,
where |P sf (G)| = µ. Denote by ν(P ) the index of path P ∈ P sf (G) in the above ordering.
Remark 2. Let r = ν(P SP 2 ), A 0 = ∅, k ≥ 1 and assume the evader is greedy. Then, for any z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1} path P (z) is blocked at t = 2 by the interdictor. Remark 2 is implied by the definition of a greedy evader. Furthermore, since A 0 = ∅ and k ≥ 1, we have r > 1. Next, we formulate necessary conditions for an evasion solution to be optimal in the case of T = 2 and A 0 = ∅. Proposition 2. Assume that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle with A 0 = ∅ and k ≥ 1. Let T = 2 and r = ν(P SP 2 ), r ≥ 2. If P OP T 1 = P (i) and P OP T 2 = P (j) is an optimal solution of the evader's problem for T = 2, then either i = 1 and j = r, or P (i) and P (j) satisfy the following conditions:
ℓ(P (1) ) + ℓ(P (r) ) > ℓ(P (i) ) + ℓ(P (j) ),
1 < i < r, 1 < j < r and i = j.
Proof. First, suppose that the greedy policy is optimal. As A 0 = ∅, then by definition of r we have that the greedy evader follows P (1) and P (r) sequentially. Hence, i = 1 and j = r.
Conversely, assume that the optimal evasion policy is not greedy. Therefore, condition (5) holds. Thus, we need to show that conditions (4) and (6) are satisfied.
Assume that (6) is not satisfied. Then we consider the following three possible cases:
(i ) We have that either i ≥ r or j ≥ r. Without loss of generality let i ≥ r. Then due to the above path ordering assumption given by (3) the following inequalities hold:
which implies that (5) is violated and results in a contradiction.
(ii ) We have that i = 1. It implies that the greedy evader is optimal and (5) is not satisfied (recall that the greedy evader traverses through P (1) at t = 1).
(iii ) We have that j = 1. In other words, path P (1) is not blocked at t = 2. Recall that the interdictor is a greedy semi-oracle. Hence, P (i) and P (1) are arc-disjoint, i.e., P (i) ∩ P (1) = ∅, which implies that if A 0 = ∅ and the evader is greedy, then P (i) cannot be blocked by the interdictor at t = 2. Consequently, from Remark 2 we conclude that i ≥ r and thus, we can simply refer to the discussion above in (i ).
We conclude that condition (6) is satisfied.
Finally, assume that (4) is violated and thus, either P (i) or P (j) is arc-disjoint with P (1) . Hence, if the evader is greedy and A 0 = ∅ , then either P (i) or P (j) , respectively, cannot be blocked at t = 2. Therefore, we have that either i ≥ r or j ≥ r (recall again Remark 2), which contradicts (6) and hence, completes the proof.
We conclude that under our mild assumption (3) there exist two alternatives: either the greedy policy is optimal or there exist two alternative paths that intersect with the shortest path (4) and their cumulative cost is smaller than the loss obtained by the greedy approach, see (5) .
Recall that in Example 1 the optimal evasion solution is arc-disjoint, i.e., it consists of two arc-disjoint paths of minimal total cost. The latter observation can be generalized as follows. If parameter k is sufficiently large, then the optimal solution of the evader's problem is arc-disjoint since the interdictor is able to block all arcs traversed by the evader. The major issue is to determine whether the optimal solution can be neither greedy, nor arc-disjoint. The following example shows that the optimal solution of the evader's problem with T = 2 and A 0 = ∅ may contain two distinct paths that intersect on the overall shortest path. Figure 6 and let s = 1, f = 11. Assume that T = 2, k = 3 and A 0 = ∅. Observe that in the first round the greedy evader follows the in the second round and her cumulative loss is given by L SP 2 = 0 + 11 = 11. Moreover, any arc-disjoint solution, i.e., two arc-disjoint paths from s to f , has a cumulative cost of at least 11. Nevertheless, consider a strategic evader who traverses through path P SE 1 = {1 → 3 → 4 → . . . → 11} in the first round. Then the interdictor blocks set I 1 = {(4, 5), (6, 7) , (8, 9) } to block all paths of cost 8. Then the strategic evader follows path P SE 2 = {1 → 12 → 11} and suffers cumulative loss L SE 2 = 1 + 9 = 10 < L SP 2 . We conclude that the optimal solution of the evader's problem is neither greedy, nor arc-disjoint.
Example 3. Consider the network depicted in
Further, for the network used in Example 1 we outlined that the greedy evasion solution can be far enough from the optimal solution, i.e., it cannot approximate the optimal solution with any constant factor. The following example shows that this fact remains true for a pair of arc-disjoint paths of minimal total cost, if we use a different network structure. Figure 7 and let T = 2, A 0 = ∅ and k = 2. If parallel arcs are not possible, then each arc of cost M can be replaced with two arcs of cost M 2 . Observe that L SP 2 = 0 + 2M = 2M, while any arc-disjoint solution has cost 3M. This example can be simply generalized by adding arcs of cost 0 together with parallel arcs of cost M. We observe that L SP 2 = 0 + 2M = 2M and the cost of any arc-disjoint solution is given by M |A| 2 . Thus, the approximation factor for any arc-disjoint solution cannot be bounded by a constant.
Example 4. Consider network depicted in
We conclude that in general both greedy and arc-disjoint solutions can be suboptimal in the case of T = 2 and A 0 = ∅. Furthermore, the optimal evasion policy can be neither greedy, nor arc-disjoint, in a presumably tight class of instances; see, e.g., Example 3. However, the last observation gives us a basis for modelling heuristic approaches of finding strategic evasion decisions. Finally, we show that in a particular case of k = 1 the greedy evasion policy is optimal. This fact partially motivates using greedy policies as benchmark policies in the heuristic algorithm of Section 6. Furthermore, we make a remark that appeals to the case when assumption (3) does not hold. Proof. Conversely, suppose that the greedy evader is not optimal. Denote by P (i) and P (j) the optimal solution of the evader's problem. By Remark 2, if the evader is greedy and A 0 = ∅, then for any z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1} path P (z) is blocked at t = 2 by the interdictor. Since the interdictor's budget k = 1 we conclude that all paths P (z) , z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1}, have an arc in common, i.e., there exist e ∈ A such that e ∈ P (z) , z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1}.
Consider a strategic evader who traverses P (i) and P (j) sequentially. By Proposition 2 we have 1 < i, j < r and, thus, e ∈ P (i) ∩ P (j) . Observe that with A 1 = P (i) the greedy semi-oracle interdictor must block e and, thus, P (j) cannot be traversed by the strategic evader at t = 2. It contradicts to our assumption that P (i) and P (j) form the optimal evasion solution.
Remark 3. Note that Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 hold even in the case when assumption (3) is violated. However the following observations should be considered:
• Since some paths may have equal costs the greedy evasion solution is not necessarily unique. Without loss of generality let i = 1 and j = r correspond to the optimal greedy solution with respect to the cumulative loss;
• The alternative paths may have equal costs, see, e.g., Example 1;
• Inequalities (6) should be replaced with the following conditions: l(P (1) ) < l(P (i) ) < l(P (r) ), l(P (1) ) < l(P (j) ) < l(P (r) ) Recall that we use assumption (3) for simplicity of exposition.
Heuristic Algorithm for Strategic Evader
In this section we propose a heuristic algorithm for the strategic evader. The key idea of the algorithm is motivated by theoretical observations provided in the previous section, namely, 2, and is based on the two-step "look-ahead" concept. Specifically, in each decision epoch the evader has two options: either she follows the greedy policy, or seeks for two alternative paths that can be traversed sequentially and their cumulative loss is strictly less than the loss obtained by the greedy approach. The pair of alternative paths is generated in a heuristic manner (see the details further in this section) by blocking a subset of arcs of some predefined cardinality of the shortest path in the network and then verifying that conditions (4)-(5) of Proposition 2 hold. It is also important to note that because of its two-step look-ahead scheme our algorithm can be applied in an iterative manner for any arbitrary time horizon T .
We assume that the heuristic has access to an interdiction oracle that returns a set of kmost vital arcs in the network, currently observed by the interdictor. In general, the k-most vital arcs problem is known to be NP -hard [22] . However, it can be rather effectively solved by decomposition algorithms (see, e.g., [3] ) that are typically faster than a naive branch-andbound approach. Moreover, taking into account the structure of the problem, the decomposition algorithms can often be speeded up if we store previous evasion decisions.
Next, we discuss the key features of our algorithm in details and describe its links to Proposition 2. We refer to Algorithm 1 for the pseudocode.
At the beginning of the τ -th period the evader observes the information collected by the interdictor up to time t = τ , i.e., set A τ −1 and the corresponding blocking decision I τ . First, in lines 6 − 9 of Algorithm 1 we compute the evader's loss if she follows the greedy policy. (Note that we use P SP τ and P SP τ +1 to denote these paths as they do not necessarily coincide with P SP τ and P SP τ +1 due to the iterative nature of the heuristic.) Then in lines 13−24 we seek for a pair of alternative paths that can provide a better decision for the evader, e.g., if T = 2 and A 0 = ∅, then our construction ensures that these paths satisfy conditions (4)-(5) of Proposition 2. However, recall that Proposition 2 hold for A 0 = ∅ and do not take into account problems with A 0 = ∅. The latter is a more challenging case as the properties of alternative paths strongly depend on the set of initial information (see, e.g., Example 2). Therefore, we resort to generating these paths in a heuristic manner as detailed below.
Specifically, to construct the first alternative path we first block q ∈ Z >0 arcs of P SP τ together with set I τ and identify the shortest path in the interdicted network, which is assumed to be the first alternative path; see line 13 of Algorithm 1. As we block q arcs of the shortest path, P SP τ , the newly constructed path, referred to as P SE τ , does not coincide with P SP τ . In line 14 we verify, first, whether P SE τ contains some arcs from P SP τ and, furthermore, whether its loss is sufficiently small. The former requirement is motivated by condition (4) of Proposition 2, while the latter requirement is controlled via the heuristic parameter α and is linked to the evader's loss under the greedy policy; see line 14 of Algorithm 1 and our additional comments below. If both of these requirements are satisfied, then in line 18 we generate the second alternative path, P SE τ +1 , in a greedy manner by assuming that P SE τ is traversed at t = τ .
In line 21 we check whether the constructed solution is better than the best available solution, which coincides with a greedy one at the first iteration; see lines 10 and 11. Then we repeat the overall procedure in an iterative manner by blocking another subset of q arcs of P SP τ .
Algorithm 1: Heuristic Algorithm for the Strategic Evader 1 Input: Directed graph G = (N, A, C) , the source and destination nodes for the evader, the maximum number of arcs that can be blocked by the interdictor k, index of the current time epoch τ , set of arcs A τ −1 that are known to the interdictor, heuristic parameters α ∈ (0, 1] and q ∈ Z > 0 2 Output: Evasion decisions for the next one or two time epochs
) a threshold that depends on the heuristic parameter α 11 for (b (1) As briefly outlined in the discussion above the developed heuristic has two tunable parameters: α and q. The first one, α ∈ (0, 1], is used as the measure of difference in the cumulative loss between the paths generated under the greedy policy and two potential alternatives. In particular, for larger values of α the algorithm takes into consideration a larger subset of paths that intersect with P SP τ . Thus, by increasing the value of α we increase the running time of the heuristic, but potentially improve the quality of the obtained myopic solution for the two-steps look-ahead approach.
Furthermore, we use parameter q to characterize the number of arcs of P SP τ that are blocked in addition to I τ in order to ensure that the first of the newly constructed alternative paths does not coincide with P SP τ . The choice of q is related with the following trade-off. Consider the case of T = 2 and A 0 = ∅. Note that Proposition 2 implies that the alternative paths have some arcs in common with the shortest path. Intuitively, we strive to minimize the cardinality of these arc intersection subsets as the alternative paths must be traversed sequentially. To achieve this goal, we need to choose a sufficiently large value of q. On the other hand, the loss of the first alternative path is required to be less than threshold δ τ (recall line 16 of Algorithm 1), which, in turn, requires a sufficiently small value of q.
Computational Study
In this section we compare our heuristic for the strategic evader (Algorithm 1) against the greedy policy. We show that the heuristic approach performs sufficiently well even for rather large values of T (recall that Algorithm 1 is myopic as it generates evasion decision only for at most two time epochs) and consistently outperforms the greedy policy on several classes of synthetic network instances. The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, in Section 6.1 we describe our test instances and the implementation issues. Then in Section 6.2 we discuss the obtained computational results.
Preliminaries
The test instances used in our experiments are represented by three classes of random graphs, specifically, layered, uniform [23] and Barabasi-Albert (BA) [24] graphs. The test instances are constructed as follows:
• Layered graphs. Each of our random layered graphs consists of h layers with r i nodes in the i-th layer, where r i for i ∈ {2, . . . , h − 1} is generated according to the discrete uniform distribution in the interval [r min , r max ]. The first and last layers consist of a single node, i.e., r 1 = r h = 1 , that are the source and destination nodes, respectively. An arc between a pair of nodes from the i-th and j-th layers is generated with probability p j−i . Furthermore, the source node is connected by a directed arc to all nodes in layer 2, while all nodes in layer h − 1 are connected to the destination node. All arc costs are generated according to the discrete uniform distribution in the interval [0, 100|j − i|]. In our experiments we set h = 10, r min = 4, r max = 6 and p = 0.5.
• Uniform graphs. For each two nodes i and j in the graph, directed arc (i, j) exists with probability p; see further details on undirected random graphs of this type in [23] . All arc costs are generated according to the discrete uniform distribution in the interval [0, 100]. The source and destination nodes are selected as follows. First, given graph G we compute its diameter, diam(G), and construct a list of all node pairs such that Table 2 : Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the layered random graphs. The interdictor's observes the arc costs with a uniform noise of 20%. For different values of T and k we report the averages and standard deviations of χ < (T, k), χ = (T, k) and χ > (T, k) over 10 replications.
the distance between the nodes is approximately diam(G)/2. Then a pair of nodes is chosen from this list uniformly at random to be the source and destination nodes. In our experiments we set |N| = 50 and p = 0.5.
• BA graphs. These graphs are constructed based on the following preferential attachment mechanism. Suppose m 0 is a number of nodes in the initial complete graph. Then in each iteration we add a node and connect it with m ≤ m 0 existing nodes randomly with probabilities proportional to their degrees; see further details in [24] . We set |N| = 50, m = m 0 = 5. The arc costs as well as the source and destination nodes are generated in the same manner as for the uniform random graphs described above.
In all our experiments we construct A 0 in the following way. For each particular arc a ∈ A with probabilityp = 0.5 we remove this arc from the graph and with probability 1 −p do nothing. Then we add the shortest path in the resulting network to A 0 . The experiment is repeated 5 times and, thus, A 0 consists of at most 5 distinct paths from s to f . Furthermore, we consider different types of the feedback given from the evader to the interdictor. In addition to the case of the transparent feedback described in assumption A5 we Table 4 : Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the uniform random graphs. The interdictor's observes the arc costs with a uniform noise of 20%. For different values of T and k we report the averages and standard deviations of χ < (T, k), χ = (T, k) and χ > (T, k) over 10 replications.
consider the case when the interdictor has only a noised information about the arc costs. More precisely, we generate perturbed cost vectors beforehand for each t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. Further, we use this information to solve a k-most vital arcs problem in period t both for the greedy and strategic approaches. All experiments are performed on a PC with CPU i5-7200U and RAM 6 GB. The heuristic for the strategic evader (see Algorithm 1) is implemented in Java with CPLEX 1271. We use the algorithm from [3] to solve the k-most vital arcs problem in Algorithm 1. Furthermore, we set α = 0.5 and q = 2 as the heuristic parameters. Following the discussion above, if α < 0.5, then some alternative solutions can be not taken into account, while α > 0.5 implies a possibly redundant enumeration. On the other hand, the choice of q = 2 attempts to reduce the number of calls to the interdiction oracle and provides pretty consistent computational results.
Results and Discussion
To report the computational results we use the following measures of performance. Specifically, let Q be the total number of test instances for a particular class of random graphs and specific values of T and k. Then denote by χ = (T, k) the percentage of test instances, where the performance of the greedy policy and the proposed heuristic approach coincide, i.e., the evader's losses obtained by these methods are the same. Also, denote by χ < (T, k) the percentage of test instances, where the heuristic outperforms the greedy policy. Note that the percentage of test instances, where the heuristic approach is outperformed by the greedy policy is given by:
We use χ = , χ < and χ > as the performance measures of the proposed heuristic in Tables 1-6 .
We set Q = 50, k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and T ∈ {2, 5, 10}. The experiment is repeated 10 times and in Tables 1, 3 and 5, we report average values and standard deviations for the considered measures of performance for each class of random graphs described in Section 6.1. In Tables 2, 4 and 6 the same computational results are provided assuming that the interdictor observes the arc costs with a uniform noise of 20%. Further, Table 7 presents average running times of the heuristic algorithm with respect to the discussed classes of graphs, k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and T = 10.
In the remainder of the section, whenever we refer to the strategic evader or the heuristic we imply that the evader uses Algorithm 1 in the iterative manner over the specified time horizon T (recall that Algorithm 1 computes an evasion decision only for at most two decision epochs).
First, consider the case of T = 2 that corresponds to the first column in each of the tables. We observe that χ > (2, k) = 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} in all tables. In other words, the strategic evader is always at least as good as the greedy evader for T = 2. This heuristic performance is expected given that, first, Algorithm 1 compares possible alternative solutions with a solution of the greedy policy for two steps ahead; furthermore, whenever the heuristic cannot find a good quality alternative solution, then the heuristic resorts to the greedy policy solution.
Next, we note that for a fixed value of k, the value of χ < (T, k) tends to grow with the increase in T . In other words, the number of instances, where the heuristic outperforms the greedy policy increases. This observation is intuitive given that as the number of decision epochs increases there are more opportunities for the strategic evader to improve her performance.
On the other hand, we observe that the value of χ > (T, k) also increases with T . For example, for k = 4 in Table 1 , χ > (T, 4) monotonously increases from 0 to 17.6. It implies that as T increases there exist instances, where the greedy policy outperforms the proposed heuristic. This fact is also not surprising if one recalls that the heuristic is myopic as it computes evasion decisions only for at most two decision epochs by applying Algorithm 1 in the iterative manner.
Nevertheless, in all cases we have that χ < (T, k) > χ > (T, k) on average, which implies that the evader should prefer using the heuristic than the greedy policy. Note that χ = (T, k) (i.e., the number of instances where the performances of the approaches coincide) decreases as T increases, which is natural given the above discussion.
Furthermore, observe that for fixed T with the increase of k, the value of χ < (T, k) tends to Table 5 : Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the BA random graphs. The interdictor's feedback is transparent. For different values of T and k we report the averages and standard deviations of χ < (T, k), χ = (T, k) and χ > (T, k) over 10 replications. Table 6 : Comparison of the greedy policy against the heuristic for the strategic evader in the BA random graphs. The interdictor's observes the arc costs with a uniform noise of 20%. For different values of T and k we report the averages and standard deviations of χ < (T, k), χ = (T, k) and χ > (T, k) over 10 replications.
grow, while χ = (T, k) tends to decrease. This observation can be explained as follows. If the value of k is sufficiently large, then the heuristic is more likely to find a pair of arc-disjoint alternative paths and its performance improves; see, e.g., Example 1. In fact, recall that Algorithm 1 makes a partial enumeration of alternative path pairs by "forbidding" a subset of arcs from the shortest path. Table 7 : Average running times (in seconds) of the heuristic algorithm for the strategic evader (Algorithm 1) applied for T = 10 with respect to different values of parameter k and considered classes of random graphs, i.e., the layered, uniform and BA graphs.
for the strategic evader outperforms the greedy policy. Moreover, despite its myopic two-step look ahead structure our approach can be successfully applied even for rather large values of parameter T . Finally, we note that the obtained results are pretty consistent with respect to all considered classes of random graphs and types of the feedback given from the evader to the interdictor.
Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a class of sequential interdiction settings where the interdictor has incomplete initial information about the network while the evader has complete knowledge of the network, including its structure and arc costs. However, by observing the evader's actions (we assume perfect feedback), the interdictor learns about the network structure and costs and thus, can adjust his actions in subsequent time periods.
Our focus is on the evader's perspective. In particular, we assume that the interdictor acts in a greedy manner, by blocking k arcs known to him in each time period. Such greedy interdiction policies are known from the literature to perform well against greedy evaders who traverse along the shortest path in the unblocked network in each time period. In this paper, we show that the evader can improve her performance by acting in a strategic manner. Specifically, we derive constructive properties of optimal evasion policies for two time periods when the interdictor has no initial information about the network structure. We show that the evader's problem is strongly NP -hard even with respect to the class of instances when the interdiction problem is polynomially solvable. Furthermore, there exist no polynomial time approximation algorithms with a fixed worst case bound.
Furthermore, based on these theoretical observations, we design a heuristic algorithm for a strategic evader in a general setting with an arbitrary time horizon and any initial information available to the interdictor. The algorithm for a strategic evader is based on a two-step lookahead idea. In fact, the strategic evader either follows a greedy shortest-path based policy, or seeks for two alternative paths that satisfy the developed constructive properties. Our computational experiments demonstrate that the proposed heuristic consistently outperforms the greedy evasion policy on several classes of synthetic network instances with respect to different sets of initial information and types of the feedback available to the interdictor. With respect to future research directions, it would be interesting to consider other types of feedbacks possibly in a stochastic setting, see, e.g., related works in [13, 25] for the analysis of different types of feedback in a classical multi-armed bandit setting. Furthermore, in our study we assume that the evader observes the blocking decision before choosing a path. Hence, one may explore the evader's problem with this assumption relaxed. For example, the study in [26] considers a class of interdiction problems where at every node in the evader's path the interdictor must decide whether or not to expand the interdiction set. Finally, in this paper we focus on the heuristic solution approach. Nevertheless, one may consider developing exact algorithms for the bilevel optimization formulation of our problem.
However, in our setting the lower-level problem is non-convex as it contains integrality restrictions for the follower's (interdictor's) variables, which makes solving the bilevel problem
